Patrick McNutt’s book is a brilliant exposé of the interaction between law, economics and antitrust. The author, an economist and distinguished regulator, handles both the legal and economic material deftly. It is provocative particularly when dealing with issues such as the efficiency of competition and the effectiveness of antitrust rules. His case-studies are particularly compelling.The book is written with huge flair and great learning. It combines theoretical and practical considerations. The comparative coverage is excellent. A “must-read” for all interested in law and economics. Antitrust specialists will discover many novel and valid insights.”
– David O’Keeffe, University College London, UK and College of Europe, Belgium
“This book continually stimulates the reader to think about the issues in non-standard and illuminating ways, following new and significant directions. Yet the discussion always is authoritatively grounded in the author’s extensive knowledge of the pertinent law and the relevant economic analysis.”
– William J. Baumol, New York University, US and Princeton University, US
“Professor McNutt provides a refreshing and different perspective on the important fundamental issues underlying competition law and policy.”
– Barry E. Hawk, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, US
In this accessible yet rigorous textbook, Patrick McNutt presents a clear and refreshing approach to a wide range of topics in law, economics and antitrust. The issues covered include duty and obligation, contracting, liability, property rights, efficient entry, compensation, oligopoly pricing, issues in strategic antitrust and merger analysis.
Using a selection of case studies where appropriate, and examples based in game theory, the book examines these issues from both a law and economics and a microeconomics perspective. Emphasis is placed on a thorough assessment of the economic and legal arguments, blending the rigours of microeconomic analysis with common law standards. The analysis contained in the book will not only review, and indeed adapt neoclassical economic analysis but will also apply some of the methodology from the relatively new paradigm known as ‘law and economics’ to many of the issues. The book also addresses the increasing overlap between emerging approaches in public choice and in law and economics.
Practitioners in competition law and regulation of utilities will draw great value from this original and pertinent volume, as will scholars in the areas of regulation, competition law, competition policy and law and economics.
