Welcome text by Prof Patrick McNutt
A very warm welcome to the new software tool called Kaelo . The origin of the word is Romany gypsy, meaning black in colour, and I first heard it as a name when used by my grandmother for her black Irish collie pup. The software will help to guide you through some of the foundation steps in microeconomics. The illustrations will capture the concepts of demand and elasticity, introduce the Marris model of management behaviour, explain the basics of the concentration ratios as deployed in modern antitrust and introduce you to the foundations of basic non cooperative game theory. Kaelo compliments the executive support materials located on my web page www.patrickmcnutt.com . It also compliments the e-learning initiatives for the Managerial Economics module under the auspices of the Manchester Business School Worldwide at www.mbs-worldwide.ac.uk . Kaelo is a prototype version and we welcome your feedback on how it can be improved. Please note that we are working on new developments for Kaelo as we strive to integrate e-leaning tools with on-line discussions and course work support.
10 principles:
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All individuals or agents who have either a direct or indirect interest in a firm (for example, management and shareholder) or in a decision of a firm (for example, rival firms or consumers). The stakeholder set is open and compact.
The stakeholder firm or s-firm represents a firm that focuses on employee’s productivity and consumers’ interests and expectations inclusively of profits and revenues.
Political scarcity arises in the absence of sufficient representative voters, allowing a small majority of key voters to determine the outcome in an election with a small voter turnout
Voters who are discriminated against by virtue of class or income arising from low voter participation. Voters are also rationed if specific issues are not addressed by the duly elected politicians.
Term coined by McNutt to refer to former paramilitaries or militants who become legitimate duly elected democratic politicians contributing to the stability of a post-conflict political system.
The legitimacy refers to the democratic stability that ensues with the presence of para-politicians as democratically elected in a post-conflict political system. Democratic politicians face the choice of anarchy (no political order) or the legitimacy of para-politicians.
The situation arises when policies or resources directed towards the poor serves only to exacerbate the poverty problem. More resources are expended yet poverty remains.
An individual or agent who can only see the negative side of particular viewpoints or fails to appreciate the remote possibility of a positive sum game.
The bureaucrat who can always ruthlessly save a penny but cannot spend a penny judiciously.
An individual displays detached anonymity in a post-meeting environment when the individual surrounds himself or herself with the contours of an anonymous decision implying disagreement with the unanimous outcome.
Occurs during management appraisals or bilaterals with management when employees are actually demoted by peer evaluation.
Occurs when there is evaluation within an organisation by using performance indicators of the lowest common denominator instead of an emerging benchmark.
In sampling and answering questionnaires, the Hawthorne effect will occur if the respondent always give the reply they expect the questionnaire actually wants.
The Penrose effect exists within a firm or organisation when there are managerial limitations; such limitations can arise due to management inexperience or inefficient and sub-optimal decision making.
Occurs when management decisions are limited by information deficit or information overload or as a direct consequence of bad information.
A history-future perspective is one where the past is no longer permanent rather it is integrated with the present. For example, whatever changes will be required of management and business, the changes will be guided by an economic reality in business that costs of delay in time to market (of products and services) coupled with capacity constraints at the production level can be damaging to the firm.
To know the parameters of a No will secure a Yes. Once you understand what it is (the x) that precipitates a ‘no’ answer, a ‘yes’ answer can be secured by understanding what x actually is, the parameters of a ‘no’ answer.
The number of products sufficiently diversified in different markets to maintain a global market share.
A credible collective response by competitors to a market event such that no one competitor acts unilaterally and all competitors are observed to behave together. It can give rise to an accidental sameness in price (ASP) observation absent tacit collusion as argued in McNutt’s Law, Economics and Antitrust.
A strategic move the objective of which is solely and exclusively to minimise risk. Management realise that maximising market share is about avoiding falling shares rather than increasing the share level.
Ceiling signs occur in an organisation when a subordinate’s decision-making is capped and then subsequently credited by other more senior people in the organisation.
Two approaches to a given problem create a perpendicular solution when both have equal weight in the argument. The inverse of the perpendicular is the symmetry of the same, and thus, there will be no unique solution.
A price dwarf is a movement in price that is not sufficiently robust as a price signal to trigger a price war between two competing players.
A price that is so low in a non-cooperative price game that it continues to fall to its lowest level, the zero-price equilibrium.
This arise when a mission to do something translates into an observed omission. so that nothing seems to fit into place. Example with national utility regulators regulating price in a market of rising prices.
Book: Law, Economics and Antitrust – Towards a New Perspective

Patrick McNutt’s book is a brilliant exposé of the interaction between law, economics and antitrust. The author, an economist and distinguished regulator, handles both the legal and economic material deftly. It is provocative particularly when dealing with issues such as the efficiency of competition and the effectiveness of antitrust rules. His case-studies are particularly compelling.The book is written with huge flair and great learning. It combines theoretical and practical considerations. The comparative coverage is excellent. A “must-read” for all interested in law and economics. Antitrust specialists will discover many novel and valid insights.”
– David O’Keeffe, University College London, UK and College of Europe, Belgium
“This book continually stimulates the reader to think about the issues in non-standard and illuminating ways, following new and significant directions. Yet the discussion always is authoritatively grounded in the author’s extensive knowledge of the pertinent law and the relevant economic analysis.”
– William J. Baumol, New York University, US and Princeton University, US
“Professor McNutt provides a refreshing and different perspective on the important fundamental issues underlying competition law and policy.”
– Barry E. Hawk, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, US
In this accessible yet rigorous textbook, Patrick McNutt presents a clear and refreshing approach to a wide range of topics in law, economics and antitrust. The issues covered include duty and obligation, contracting, liability, property rights, efficient entry, compensation, oligopoly pricing, issues in strategic antitrust and merger analysis.
Using a selection of case studies where appropriate, and examples based in game theory, the book examines these issues from both a law and economics and a microeconomics perspective. Emphasis is placed on a thorough assessment of the economic and legal arguments, blending the rigours of microeconomic analysis with common law standards. The analysis contained in the book will not only review, and indeed adapt neoclassical economic analysis but will also apply some of the methodology from the relatively new paradigm known as ‘law and economics’ to many of the issues. The book also addresses the increasing overlap between emerging approaches in public choice and in law and economics.
Practitioners in competition law and regulation of utilities will draw great value from this original and pertinent volume, as will scholars in the areas of regulation, competition law, competition policy and law and economics.